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MADE IN TAIWAN: ALTERNATIVE GLOBAL MODELS FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
Stewart Chang* 
Abstract 
This Article comparatively analyzes the judicial decisions that led to same-sex 
marriage equality in Taiwan, South Africa, and the United States. After first 
evaluating the structural mechanisms that led Taiwan to become the first Asian 
nation to legalize same-sex marriage through Interpretation No. 748 of the Taiwan 
Constitutional Court, this Article then draws comparisons to how marriage equality 
was similarly affected through a delayed imposition of the court order in South 
Africa to allow the legislature an opportunity to rectify the law in Minister of Home 
Affairs v. Fourie, and finally considers how these approaches provide equally viable 
and more inclusive alternatives to the incrementalist strategy employed by gay rights 
activists in the United States that resulted in Obergefell v. Hodges. In the United 
States, same-sex marriage equality was accomplished through an incrementalist 
approach that recommends a certain ordering/or judicial lawmaking- that societal 
values must change and evolve first, and action by the Court follows after to reflect 
the change in societal morals. The Taiwanese and South African decisions, on the 
other hand, are more proactive and suggest a different ordering/or judicial change 
- that it is the duty of the government to define and shape the evolution of societal
values, which is best accomplished when the judiciary works in tandem with the
legislature to spearhead that social change.• Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law. I am grateful toIan Bartrum, Peter Bayer, Frank Rudy Cooper, Ruben Garcia, Daniel Hamilton, Sheldon Lyke, ElizabethManriquez, Paul Mata, Manoj Mate, Terry Pollman, Mark West, and Seval Yildirim for their helpfulcomments, feedback, and conversation in writing this piece.
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 24, 2017, the Taiwan Constitutional Court issued Interpretation No. 
7 48, 1 which declared the portion of the Taiwan Civil Code that prohibits same­
sex marriage as an unconstitutional violation of the freedom to marry and the right 
to equality. The decision contains a delayed application clause that allows the 
legislature a grace period of two years to amend the Civil Code before the decision 
would go into effect. Notwithstanding the remedial delay, international reaction 
to Interpretation 748 has been overwhelmingly positive, as it has been praised for 
placing Taiwan in the position of becoming the first Asian country to legalize 
same-sex marriage. The fact that Taiwan is being regarded by the international 
community as the vanguard for Asia to catch up with the rest of the world, 
however, is slightly problematic as it buys into the myth that Asia is primitive and 
grossly underdeveloped in respect to gay rights when compared to the West. 
Recognition of the rights of sexual minorities has increasingly become the 
benchmark by which the Global North has differentiated itself from the Global 
South in terms of progress and modernity.2 Yet as of the writing of this Article, 
only a small minority consisting of 24 countries around the world has legalized 
same-sex marriage. Many Western countries, including Australia and many parts 
of Europe, still do not recognize same-sex marriage. In fact, Germany and Malta 
legalized same-sex marriage after the decision in Taiwan.3 This Article seeks to 
dispel the myth that Asia is necessarily behind Western countries in respect to gay 
rights, and looks at the Taiwan same-sex marriage equality case as a model not to 
be emulated only by Asia, but by the rest of the world, including the West. 
Interpretation 748 has drawn comparisons to Obergefel! v. Hodges,4 the case 
that legalized same-sex marriage equality at the national level in the United States. 
This comparison suggests that Taiwan is behind the United States and follows the 
United States in respect to gay rights. Media reports indeed indicated that the 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748 (May 24, 2017, Taiwan), 
http://www.judicial.gov. tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03 _ 0 I .asp?expno=748. 
2 See Katherine Franke, Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights, 44 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. I, 5 (2012) ("Modern states arc expected to recognize a sexual minority within the 
national body and grant that minority rights-based protections. Pre-modern states do not. Once 
recognized as modern, the state's treatment ofhomosexuals offers cover for other sorts of human rights 
shortcomings."). See also Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World", in 
International lmv and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913, 925 (2000) (describing how the 
Third World has been popularly characterized by "irrational local fundamentalism . . .  technological 
'backwardness,' or simply lack of modernity"); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 248 (2003) 
( critiquing the way human rights in developing countries are constructed as playing "catch-up with the 
West"). 
3 Allison Smale & David Shimer, German Parliament Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/world/europe/germany-gay-marriage.html; 
Associated Press, Malta legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/20 I 7 /07 /12/world/europe/malta-same-scx-marriage-legal ized.html. 
4 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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release of the Obergefell decision was the temporal indicator that Taipei mayor 
Ko Wen-Je was looking for as a signal to finally make good on his campaign 
promise to push for same-sex marriage in Taiwan.5 Subsequently in July 2015, 
scarcely a month following Obergefell, the City of Taipei became the primary 
petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Taiwan's marriage law, which 
would lead to the landmark court decision by the Taiwan Constitutional Court 
with Interpretation 748.6 Then, as a rare citation to foreign law, the Taiwan 
Constitutional Court specifically references Obergefell in the decision. Thus, at 
first blush it does appear as though Taiwan has been following in the footsteps of 
the United States, and specifically Justice Kennedy's jurisprudential lead in 
Obergefell. 
However, even though Interpretation 748 cites Obergefell, the case strongly 
departs from Obergefell 's analytical framework. Obergefell is decided primarily 
as an issue of due process protection of the fundamental right to marry-it does 
not, nor does it seek to, recognize gay individuals as members of a constitutionally 
protected class. Interpretation 748, on the other hand, is at its core an equal 
protection case that is more expansive than Obergefell in deeming sexual 
orientation a protected classification. In this respect, Taiwan provides an 
alternative interpretive model for constitutional protection of gay rights that 
sharply diverges from the model espoused in the United States. Rather, 
Interpretation 7 48 more closely resembles a case that it does not cite, and one that 
comes from another non-Western nation: Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie7 
from post-Apartheid South Africa. Both Fourie and Interpretation 748 are equal 
protection cases that engage in delayed remedial solutions as alternative strategies 
to minimize public backlash against perceived judicial activism, which was also 
a principal motivating factor, but led to a different way gay rights was litigated in 
the United States. 
The incrementalist litigation strategy that was employed by activists in the 
United States influenced the way in which the gay rights jurisprudence evolved 
as primarily an issue of due process rather than equal protection. In this respect, 
gay rights and marriage equality cases in the United States fall more squarely 
within the tradition of Supreme Court cases dealing with the penumbra! right of 
privacy in matters of family formation, which starts with Griswoldv. Connecticut8 
and perhaps most famously culminates in Roe v. Wade.9 Gay rights jurisprudence 
in the United States does not emerge from the competing framework of equal 
protection that was evolving around the same time as Griswold and actually 
5 Taiwan Close to Recognizing Gay Unions, TAIPEI TIMES, June 28, 2015, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/N ews/front/archives/20 l 5/06/28/20036217 4 7 ("Alliance secretary­
general Chien Chih-chieh ... said the US is a crucial indicator for the nation, as Taiwanese politicians 
look to Washington, even though same-sex unions have already been legalized in many European 
countries ... [and in response to a question whether he would support marriage equality, mayor] Ko 
said he would wait until half of the US states recognized same-sex marriages."). 
6 Christie Chen, Taipei City to Seek Constitutional Interpretation on Gay Marriage, Focus TAIWAN 
(July 23, 2015, 9: I 0:28 PM), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201507230024.aspx. 
7 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (!) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
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applied in Loving v. Virginia, 10 which is closer akin to anti-discrimination cases 
like Brown v. Board of Education_ I I The primary pitfall of achieving same-sex 
marriage equality as a due process fundamental rights issue, however, is that it 
entrenches the institution of marriage as the normative goal for equality rather 
than dignify sexual orientation itself as a classification requiring broad 
constitution al protection. 
In this respect, this Article also contends that contrary to popular perception, 
Obergefell is not the Loving of our time. Instead, Interpretation 748 and Fourie 
pick up on the same line of inquiry that the United States abandons in respect to 
equal protection in marriage after Loving. This Article proposes that the equal 
protection analysis provided in Interpretation 748 and Fourie is a preferable 
model for achieving gay rights because it does not narrow equality as a privilege 
to be enjoyed only within the context of privacy rights, but creates more robust 
protections for gay individuals against discrimination on all levels, including 
employment and other public spaces. 
Moreover, the incrementalist approach applied in the United States is based 
on the premise that in order to avoid backlash, societal views must first be shifted, 
and only then should the judiciary follow with rulings that reflects that shift. 
lncrementalists point to the conservative political backlash following Brown and 
Roe as instances where racial and gender rights experienced a period ofregression 
following progressive Supreme Court decisions that were regarded by the public 
as judicial overreaching. Through their delayed application provisions, 
Interpretation 748 and Fourie offer another means by which to soften backlash, 
which at the same time suggest the alternative outlook that the duty of the Court 
is not to wait for social attitudes to change before making socially progressing 
rulings, but to spearhead the evolution of social norms by leading the call for 
societal progress. 
Part I offers a brief history of the same-sex marriage equality movement in 
Taiwan, and then evaluates Interpretation 748 and the analytical strategy taken 
by the Taiwan Constitutional Court in granting broader protections to the gay 
population beyond marriage. Part II compares Interpretation 748 to Fourie, and 
explains how the tumultuous histories of both countries set equal protection as a 
priority within their countries' constitutional jurisprudence. Part III considers the 
pitfalls in pigeonholing same-sex marriage equality as a due process rather than 
an equal protection issue, as has occurred in the United States, and argues that 
Interpretation 748 and Fourie proffer better models for the remainder of the world 
to follow in the future of international gay rights jurisprudence. 
I. MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN TAIWAN: FOLLOWING OR LEADING?
There has been a movement for same-sex marriage equality in Taiwan for 
some time. As early as 1986, while Taiwan was still under martial law, Chi Chia­
Wei who would eventually become one of the petitioners in Interpretation 748, 
had been appealing to all branches of the Taiwanese government-the Executive 
10 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
11 Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, and the Constitutional Court-for legal recognition 
of same-sex relationships. The government responses to his petitions were 
indifferent or negative over the course of two decades. In 2000, as the country 
was in the midst of reform under Chen Shui-Bian, the first President from the 
Democratic Progressive Party whose election signaled the end of the 
Kuomintang's continuous rule since martial law, the legislature considered a 
proposal allowing same-sex partners to "form a family" through marriage and 
adoption of children as part of the Human Rights Basic Law. 12 The law, however, 
encountered public opposition and was not introduced before the Legislature. In 
2006, Representative Hsiao Bi-Khim attempted to introduce the Same Sex 
Marriage Act, but that bill was also rejected at its early stages. 13 Thus, for three
decades the move to legalize same-sex marriage in Taiwan had gone nowhere. 
Sensing the need to organize to effectively advocate for change, gay activists 
banded together to form the Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights 
(TAPCPR) in 2009. After conducting extensive research for three years, 
TAPCPR determined that the best way to advocate for same-sex marriage equality 
was to decenter marriage as the foundation for recognition of family rights. Thus, 
it published "Three Bills for Diverse Families" that advocated for protections of 
all non-traditional family structures, including civil partnerships, same-sex 
marriages, multiple-person families, and never-married individuals with adopted 
children. The Diverse Families Movement, as it was called, even included those 
whose relationships are not based on romantic associations. Based on these 
principles, TAPCPR proposed three bills for the Taiwan legislature to consider in 
2013: same-sex marriage; a civil partnership system without restrictions as to the 
gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation of the partners; and groups of friends 
who choose to live together and take care of one another as a family. Earlier, 
Legislator Yu Mei-Nu had introduced a bill in December 2012 to amend the Civil 
Code to include same-sex marriages among legally recognized families. Then, 
taking one of the draft recommendations ofTAPCPR, Legislator Yu introduced a 
separate bill to amend the Civil Code to allow for the recognition of same-sex 
marriages in October 2013. Unlike their predecessors, both bills advanced to the 
committee stage for deliberation. 14 
In the meantime, as a result of organizing, the issue of same-sex marriage 
equality was gaining particular attention during the 2014 and 2016 election cycles. 
In 2014, Dr. Ko W en-je ran for Taipei mayor as an independent, which was quite 
unconventional. In order to gamer the support of progressive constituents, he 
promised to support the legalization of same-sex marriage. After he won the 
election, however, he stated that he would wait to see how same-sex marriage 
equality unfolded in the United States before taking action. Tsai Ing-Wen also 
committed to same-sex marriage equality as a platform issue in her 2016 
12 Victoria Hsiu-Wen Hsu, Colors of Rainbow, Shades of Family, 16 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 154, 155 
(2015). 
13 Id.; Taiwan Constitution Interpretation No. 748, 2017, Const. Ct. Interp. ii 9 (Constitutional Court, 
May 24, 2017), https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_0l.asp?expno=748 
[hereinafter Interpretation 748]. 
1• Id. 
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presidential election campaign. 15 Following her election as President in mid­
January 2016 though, momentum for legislative action on same-sex marriage 
equality had stalled. By late January 2016 the legislative bills to amend the Civil 
Code were considered dead. 16 Though her party controlled the majority of the 
seats in legislature, President Tsai became hesitant to push through marriage 
equality legislation after the election due to conservative backlash. 17 Though a 
slim majority of Taiwanese citizens supported same-sex marriage, 18 moves to 
enact legislation sparked protests from the opposition. 19 Thus, it appeared as 
though the Executive branch of government was not going to lead the move 
toward same-sex marriage equality. 
Support for same-sex marriage equality in Taiwan renewed in October 2016, 
following the suicide of a gay professor. 20 Jacques Picoux, a longtime resident of 
Taipei who taught French at National Taiwan University, became dejected when 
he lacked the legal recognition to participate in medical decisions on behalf of his 
partner of 35 years, Tseng Ching-chao, who was dying of cancer. Following 
Tseng's death, Picoux committed suicide by jumping from his high-rise apartment 
building. His story evoked massive public sympathy and resurrected efforts to 
pass same-sex marriage equality in the Legislature. Legislators Yu Mei-Nu, Hsu 
Yu-Jen, Tsai Yi-Yu, and the caucus for the New Power Party all proposed 
amendments to the Civil Code to allow for same-sex marriage.21 In December 
2016 the bills cleared the first reading after deliberation by the Judiciary and 
Organic Laws and Statutes Committee. However, further action on the bills again 
stalled and it did not appear that legal change on same-sex marriage was going to 
come from the Legislature either. Thus, the Constitutional Court stepped in with 
Interpretation 748, reasoning, "it is still uncertain when these bills will be 
reviewed on the floor of the [Legislative Yuan]. Evidently, after more than a 
15 Chris Horton, Court Ruling Could Make Taiwan First Place in Asia to Legalize Gay Marriage, N. Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/world/asia/taiwan-same-sex-marriage­
court.html?mcubz=O. 
16 Interpretation 748, supra note 13. 17 Emily Rauhala, A Backlash Against Same-Sex Marriage Tests Taiwan's Reputation for Gay Righls,
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-backlash-against­
same-sex-marriage-tests-taiwans-reputation-for-gay-rights/2017 /04/l 9/f855c8b8-2004-I I e7-bcd6-
6d I 286bc I 77 d _story.html?utm _ term=.cbc I 0960cbcc; Jeff Kingston, Same-Sex Marriage Sparks a 
'Cu/lure War' in Taiwan, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 10, 2016, 
https://www .japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/12/1 0/commentary/sex-marriage-sparks-culture-war­
taiwan/#. WaBkF63MxbU. 
18 Kingston, supra note 17 ("A recent poll suggests Taiwan is polarized on the issue of legalizing 
same-sex marriage - 46.3 percent support it, 45.4 percent oppose it"). 
19 Taiwan Debales Gay Marriage, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2016, 
https://www .economist.com/news/asia/21711096-it-would-be-first-country-asia-legal ise-it-taiwan­
debates-gay-marriage ("In mid-November, as the legislature was reviewing the draft gay-marriage 
laws, some I 0,000 protesters converged outside; some broke through the gates to stage a sit-in in the 
courtyard."); Jermyn Chow, Thousands Pro/est Against Gay Marriage Bill in Taiwan, STRAITS TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2016, 5:00AM), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/thousands-protest-against-gay-marriage­
bill-in-taiwan. 
20 Nicola Smith, Professor's Death Could See Taiwan Become First Asian Counlry to Allow Same-Sex 
Marriage, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2017, 12:00AM), 
https:/ /www .the guardian. co m/worl d/20 16/ oct/28/ professors-death-co uld-see-tai wan-become-first -
asian-country-to-allow-same-sex-marriage. 
21 Interpretation 748, supra note 13. 
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decade, the LY is still unable to pass the legislation regarding same-sex 
marriage. "22
In Interpretation 748, the Taiwan Constitutional Court considered whether 
the gender restriction under the Marriage Chapter of the Taiwan Civil Code 
violated the equal protection and fundamental rights provisions in the Taiwan 
Constitution. Marriage is controlled under Chapter 2 of Part IV of the Taiwan 
Civil Code. Article 972 of Chapter 2 provides the specific gendered language: "A 
betrothal agreement shall be made by the male and the female parties in their own 
concord." Holding to this strict interpretation of marriage, government officials 
denied marriage registrations to same-sex couples. The issue before the Court 
came about as a consolidated case that combined two separate challenges to the 
law. The first petitioner was the Taipei government. Mayor Ko Wen-je, in 
fulfillment of his campaign pledge to advocate for same-sex marriage equality, 
finally began taking action soon after the Obergefell decision was released. In 
July 2015, the Taiwan Municipal Government, at the direction of Mayor Ko, 
requested that the Ministry of the Interior, as its supervising authority, grant the 
city leave to seek a constitutional interpretation of the law from the Taiwan 
Constitutional Court. As the statutory municipality responsible for the 
registration of marriages under the Household Registration Act, the Taiwan 
Municipal Government was prohibited from registering marriages by same-sex 
couples, which the city deemed to be an unconstitutional violation of equal 
protection under Article 7 of the Taiwan Constitution and of a fundamental 
freedom under Articles 22 and 23. 
The second petitioner was Chi Chia-Wei, the prominent gay activist in 
Taiwan who had repeatedly been fighting for same-sex marriage equality in 
Taiwan for nearly three decades. Originally in 1986, while Taiwan was still under 
martial law, Chi petitioned Parliament to legalize same-sex marriage.23 Not only
was he denied, but he was subsequently detained as a political prisoner without 
charge for five months. 24 In 1988, Chi and his partner held a marriage ceremony 
in Taipei and were again unsuccessful in gaining legal recognition of their 
marriage from the government.25 In 1994, Chi petitioned the Ministry of Justice 
and the Ministry of the Interior, divisions of the Executive Branch, for recognition 
ofhis marriage. In response, the Ministry of Justice issued Letter of 1994-Fa-Lu­
Jue-17359, which instituted the official position on the definition of marriage 
under the Civil Code as between one man and one woman. 26 In 1998 and 2000, 
Chi made unsuccessful applications to the Taiwan Taipei District Court for its 
approval to have a marriage ceremony performed by the notary public. In 2001, 
the Taiwan Constitutional Court denied his appeal and dismissed his claim. Thus, 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 18. 
24 Victory at Last for Taiwan's Veteran Gay Rights Champion Chi Chia-wei, STRAITS TIMES (May 25, 
2017, I: 18PM), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/victory-at-last-for-taiwans-veteran-gay­
rights-champion-chi-chia-wei. 
25 Central News Agency, Man to Seek Constitutional Interpretation on Gay Marriage, TAIWAN NEWS 
(Dec. 24, 2014, 9:54PM), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2652956. 
26 Interpretation 748, supra note 13, at 1 8. (citing Letter of 1994-Fa-Lu-Jue-17359: "Therefore, the 
so-called "marriage" under our current Civil Code must be a union between a man and a woman, and 
does not include any same-sex union."). 
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Chi had been unsuccessful with all three branches of government in his advocacy 
for same-sex marriage equality. 
In 2013, Chi and his partner renewed their attempt to register their marriage 
at the Wanhua District household registration office in Taipei. Their application 
was denied, and so they made an administrative appeal with the Taipei City 
Government; but that appeal was also denied. Chi subsequently filed a complaint 
with the Taipei High Administrative Court, which ruled in March 2014 that the 
Wanhua office did not violate the law when it refused to register Chi's marriage. 
His subsequent appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court was also rejected in 
September 2014, which finally led to his appeal to the Taiwan Constitutional 
Court that became the subject of Interpretation 748. Like the Taipei Municipal 
Government, Chi also claimed that the law was unconstitutional as a violation of 
his Article 7 right to equal protection and his Article 22 and 23 rights. In addition, 
he claimed that the law also violated his Article IO right to freedom of movement. 
In Interpretation 748, the Taiwan Constitutional Court declares the Marriage 
Chapter of the Civil Code to be unconstitutional. The Court first rules that the 
"decisional autonomy" to determine "whether to marry" and "whom to marry'' 
were rights protected under Article 22 the Constitution. Article 22, which 
functions as an Unenumerated Rights Clause, guarantees the rights of individuals 
so long as they are not detrimental to social order or public welfare. Previously, 
the Taiwan Court had applied Article 22 to delineate the right to autonomy in 
family formation as fundamentally protected right. 27 Typically in Article 22 
cases, the Court applies the balancing test contained in Article 23 of the Taiwan 
Constitution, which reads: "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the 
preceding articles shall not be restricted by law except such as may be necessary 
to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of others, to avert an imminent danger, 
to maintain social order, or to promote public welfare." Though the petitioners in 
the Interpretation 748 case had requested a review under Article 23, the Court 
does not apply the test for determining whether the government is permitted to 
infringe upon the universal right to marriage. Instead, the Taiwan Court 
immediately shifts its line of inquiry to determine whether the restrictions on 
same-sex marriage violate equal protection under Article 7 of the Constitution. 
In coming to this finding, the Taiwan Constitutional Court engages in an 
expansive reading of Article 7. Although only "sex, religion, race, class, or party 
affiliation," are enumerated in Article 7, the Court determines that the "five 
classifications of impermissible discrimination set forth in the said Article are 
only exemplified, neither enumerated nor exhausted. Therefore, different 
treatment based on other classifications, such as disability or sexual orientation, 
shall also be governed by the right to equality under the said Article." This move 
by the Taiwan Court was significant, first in interpreting the Constitution 
27 See Interpretation No. 712, 2013, Const. Ct. Interp. (Constitutional Court Apr. 10, 2013) (finding 
that it was unconstitutional for the government to restrict Taiwanese parents from adopting children 
from Mainland China: "Marriage and family serve as the foundation by which society develops and 
shapes itself, and are thus institutionally protected by the Constitution (see Judicial Yuan 
Interpretations Nos. 362, 552, 554, and 696). The family system is based on the free development of 
personality and is essential for ensuring the functions of inheritance, education, the economy and 
culture. It is vital for an individual's growth in society and is the foundation of the creation and 
development of our society.") (Taiwan) [hereinafter Interpretation 712]. 
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expansively as to infer protections for groups not specifically enumerated, and 
secondly in making sexual orientation into a constitutionally protected category. 
In this respect, its earlier application of Article 22 functions to illustrate the ways 
in which the denial of marriage debases the human dignity of same-sex couples 
as a protected class. The Taiwan Constitutional Court finds specifically: 
"homosexuals, because of the demographic structure, have been a discrete and 
insular minority in the society. Impacted by stereotypes, they have been among 
those lacking political power for a long time, unable to overturn their legally 
disadvantaged status through ordinary democratic process. Accordingly, in 
determining the constitutionality of different treatment based on sexual 
orientation, a heightened standard shall be applied."28 The heightened standard 
becomes applicable not because the law restricts a fundamental right, but because 
the law engages in in discriminatory behavior. 
In Interpretation 748, the Taiwan Constitutional Court engages in an 
expansive reading of equal protection that is more progressive than in the United 
States. In the United States, sexual orientation, if it is protected at all, is treated 
as a subcategory of sex. In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,29 
for instance, the Seventh Circuit held that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. In so doing, however, the Seventh Circuit recognized that it 
did not have the power to expand Title VII to include sexual orientation as a 
separately protected class. As a subcategory of sex, sexual orientation 
discrimination is typically presented as inequitable treatment due to gender 
nonconformity. As such, sexual orientation is not protected in and ofitselfunder 
United States federal law, and separate protection for sexual orientation as a 
classification has been left to individual states. 
By including sexual orientation among the statuses protected under Article 7 
of the Taiwan Constitution, the Taiwan Constitutional Court is able to apply the 
heightened scrutiny test where different treatment must be aimed at furthering an 
important public interest by a means that is substantially related to that interest. 
The Court did find that reproduction and maintaining ethical order in society were 
important state interests. However, in applying the test, the Court finds that 
restrictions against same-sex marriage bear no rational basis to the alleged 
government purposes ofreproduction and safeguarding basic ethical orders. The 
ability to procreate is not a prerequisite to marriage for heterosexual coup !es, and 
the inability to procreate does not create grounds for voiding or dissolving a 
heterosexual marriage. Thus, the interest in procreation does not create a valid 
reason to treat gay couples differently. 
The Taiwan Constitutional Court further recognizes that marriage also 
advances certain ethical orders in society, such as "the minimum age of marriage, 
monogamy, prohibition of marriage between close relatives, obligation of fidelity, 
and mutual obligation to maintain each other." The Court additionally finds, 
however, that these ethical orders that are advanced in opposite-sex marriages can 
identically be advanced in same-sex marriages as well. Rather than evaluate 
whether public morality justifies restrictions on marriage, the Taiwan Court asks 
28 Interpretation 748, supra note 13, at ,r 15.
29 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. oflnd., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
153 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 34:2 
whether heterosexual couples are in a better position than same-sex couples to 
advance the morals contained in marriage. Because same-sex marriages could 
equally advance the principles of "the minimum age of marriage, monogamy, 
prohibition of marriage between close relatives, obligation of fidelity, and mutual 
obligation to maintain each other," there is no reason to treat them differently from 
opposite-sex marriages. As a result, the Taiwan Constitutional Court rules that 
the gender specific language in the Marriage Chapter of the Civil Code violates 
the right of gay individuals to have equal protection under the law. 
The case, predictably, was quite controversial prior to the ruling. One 
argument that had been lodged against the judiciary hearing the case at all was the 
fact that the legislature had already considered the issue several times over the 
years, and had considered multiple legislative drafts, but had never reached the 
point where there was critical consensus to change the law. The legislative 
process, as the argument goes, functions as a more accurate measure of 
democratic accountability in respect to the issue of same-sex marriage, and the 
judiciary should not override the representative role of the legislature. Even 
though same-sex marriage equality had come before the legislature repeated 
times, the legislature found no public mandate to act. Furthermore, President Tsai 
Ing-wen had emphasized marriage equality as a significant promise during her 
election campaign, and on top of that, her party controlled the majority of seats in 
the legislature after she was elected. 30 The fact that progress on marriage equality 
still vacillated despite this favorable political environment suggests that there was 
still resistance among significant constituencies within the population that the 
elected officials were still beholden to, and that there was not yet critical mass of 
support for marriage equality to push foJWard immediate change to the law. As 
such, any action by the judiciary could be seen as subverting the democratic 
process. Recognizing that the issue was controversial and seeking to avoid the 
perception of judicial activism, the Taiwan Constitutional Court issued the 
legislature a two-year grace period to correct the Marriage Law to conform to the 
decision in Interpretation 748. 
Public perception of judicial overreach and the legitimacy of the judicial 
process were also significant concerns among proponents of same-sex marriage 
equality in the United States, as those were the very arguments that fueled 
conservative backlash.31 For opponents, gay rights were framed as a culture war 
where core American family values were at stake. Gay rights activists responded 
in kind with an incrementalist approach that focused on how gay families are not 
opposed to but actually align with core American family values. The incremental 
approach to gay rights sought to effect change by incrementally swaying public 
opinion through a strategy ofassimilation. They presented their equal protection 
30 Elaine Jeffreys and Pan Wang, Pathways to Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in China and Taiwan:
Globalization and "Chinese Values", in BROWYN WINTER, MAXINE FOREST, & REJANE SENAC, 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A NEO-INSTITVfIONAL APPROACH 212 (2018). 
See also Fiona Keating, Tsai Ing-wen: Who is Taiwan's First Female President, leader of the 
Democratic Progressive Party?, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, Jan. 17, 2016, 
https://www. ibti mes. co. uk/tsai-i ng-wen-who-tai wans-first -female-president-I eader-democrati c­
progressi vc-party-1538440. 
31 See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Judicial Imposition of Same-Sex Marriage: The Boundaries of 
Judicial legitimacy and legitimate Redefinition of Marriage, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 79 (20 I 0). 
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argument not on the right to be treated equally despite being different, but that 
they should be treated the same because they are the same as other families. In 
the campaign for same-sex marriage equality, incrementalist activists showcased 
gay families and their similarities to other normative families. Gay individuals 
were presented as equal citizens through their assimilation into American norms 
of family,32 and their differences from the norm were underplayed. Thus, 
incrementalism in the United States focused first on eliminating the strongly 
negative stereotypes associated with the gay population that was perpetuated by 
the criminalization of same-sex activity, which would then set the framework for 
normalizing gay relationships through marriage equality. The strategy for 
litigating Lawrence v. Texas33 underplayed the sex and overplayed the relational 
aspects of sexual orientation, and this remained the strategy through United States 
v. Windsor34 and Obergefell v. Hodges.
II. MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF
INCREMENT ALISM
In citing Obergefell, the Taiwan Court implicitly credits the United States as 
the inspiring source for reform and change. However, in actuality Interpretation 
748 appears to be more closely modeled after the South African same-sex 
marriage equality case, Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie. David S. Law and 
Wen-Chen Chang have discussed the ways in which the Taiwan Court imports 
foreign law into its decisions, though often tacitly. 35 Though it never mentions 
Fourie, Interpretation 748 closely follows Fourie in both its analytical framework 
and its remedy. Fourie was also decided as a matter of equal protection, and also 
instituted a grace period for the legislature to act before the order would take 
effect. The remedial delay is a particularly distinctive feature in both cases, which 
may have been a product of the politically tumultuous histories that both countries 
share; as Law and Chang have pointed out, the Apartheid and martial law regimes 
of the two countries' pasts may have created increased sensitivity and appreciation 
for more protective legal processes and safeguards.36 
Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945. Unlike their 
European counterparts, Japan did not criminalize sodomy in its colonial laws. As 
a result, Taiwan has never had an anti-sodomy statute. Thus, Taiwan was already 
32 Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709 (2002). 
33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
34 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
35 David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523, 
557 (201 I) ("The published opinions of the TCC give the superficial appearance ofa court that makes 
relatively little use of foreign law. Actual citation of foreign law is rare, especially in majority 
opinions."). 
36 Id. at 538 ("Although the two countries may be oceans apart, the country that still formally styles 
itselfthe Republic of China shares a number of key historical and political characteristics with South 
Africa, the darling of constitutional comparativists. Both are recent democratic success stories. Like 
South Africa, Taiwan endured years of both internal and external legitimacy crises, only to rapidly 
establish itself over the last two decades as one of the most vibrant and robust constitutional 
democracies in its region of the world. And like South Africa, Taiwan possesses an independent and 
active constitutional court with an outstanding intellectual pedigree, a large policy footprint, and a 
penchant for comparative analysis."). 
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at a different starting point in respect to the advancement of gay rights than most 
other countries, including the United States, as it did not have to first contend with 
the issue of decriminalization. Though being gay was not necessarily seen in a 
positive light in Taiwan, there were not the same associations of gay behavior 
with criminality as in the United States and other countries with anti-sodomy laws. 
As a result, the same model of incremental ism that worked in the United States, 
which assumes decriminalization as the starting point, does not automatically 
apply in Taiwan. Furthermore, the resulting history of Taiwan after de­
colonization sets the stage where much of public discourse on rights and liberties 
was already focused on equal protection. 
Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the United States handed over 
control over Taiwan to the Kuomintang (KMT)-led government of the Republic 
of China. China had been in the midst of civil war between the KMT and the 
Communist Party of China, but during World War II the two sides temporary 
suspended hostilities and formed the Second United Front to stop the Japanese 
Imperial Army from conquering further portions of China. However, hostilities 
resumed soon after the end of World War II. As the KMT gradually lost ground 
to the Communists, the government imposed martial law on Taiwan in May 1949, 
where they would eventually retreat later that year. Under martial law, the exiled 
KMT government barred the formation of new political parties in Taiwan, 
ostensibly to suppress Communist insurgence. Martial law also allowed civilians 
to be tried in military rather than civil courts for sedition and other charges. 
During this period of martial law, Taiwan became an authoritarian state. For 
fear of being undermined by Communists, the KMT established strict regulations 
to secure its rule in Taiwan. The KMT disallowed opposition parties and arrested 
individuals they perceived as potentially sympathetic to Communists on the 
mainland. During this era, the KMT government also engaged in a re-Sinification 
of Taiwan, believing that the traditional "family values" contained in Chinese 
Confucian principles would help stabilize the nation. Confucianism promoted 
devotion to filial piety and respect for social authority. Governments of other 
Asian countries utilized a similar resurgence of Asian values in order to stabilize 
their nations following de-colonization. In the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, 
developing post-colonial Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia 
suggested that international human rights standards that sought to crack down on 
authoritarian policies possessed a historical bias.37 Western democracies could 
afford to grant their populations robust civil rights and civil liberty protections 
because they did not need to contend with the instabilities caused by recent 
histories of colonialism. Singapore, in particular, justified authoritarian rule as a 
necessary component of ensuring stability for a fledgling economy. It also touted 
conservative Asian values as a legitimate alternative to overly liberal Western 
values. 
Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan underwent a period of 
rapid democratization and the Constitutional Court and the Constitution, which 
had remained largely dormant and underutilized during martial law, played a 
significant role. The development of constitutional law in Taiwan following the 
37 Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, para. 8, U.N. 
Doc. NConf.157/PC/59 (1993). 
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end of marital law has been particularly sensitive to safeguarding civil liberties, 
given the severe infringements on individual freedom that occurred during martial 
law. Constitutional interpretation has erred on the side ofrespecting human rights 
and civil liberties typically associated with Western democracies. Whereas 
Confucianization and Asian values have created resistance to the import of foreign 
human rights ideals in other parts of Asia,38 the same did not occur in Taiwan. 
Rather, the Taiwanese population connected Confucian Asian values with the 
tumultuous four decades of martial law. As Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper 
note, "Specifically, pro-democracy elites identified Confucianism with the 
political authoritarianism and cultural imperialism of the pre-democratic KMT."39 
Rather than view Western democratic values as antithetical to Confucianism as a 
way to justify authoritarian rule, Taiwanese Confucianism adapted in a way that 
was consistent with democratization.40 Thus, post-martial law Taiwan developed 
a constitutional theory that embraced rather than rejected liberal individualism. 
Due to the severe restrictions placed on personal liberties during martial law, the 
population was much more receptive to creating robust protections of personal 
rights and freedoms. For example, even before Interpretation 748, Taiwan had 
enacted laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace with 
the Gender Equality in Employment Act of 2002 and amendments to the 
Employment Service Act in 2007.41 
The government of post-martial law Taiwan has also been sensitive to public 
perceptions on the legitimacy of power. As a result of the strict controls that the 
KMT established to ensure its continuing rule, many of the legislators present at 
the time martial law formally ended had occupied their seats since 1948. 42 In 
1990, the Constitutional Court issued a decision ordering that these incumbents 
vacate their positions and new elections be held. 43 Since the lifting of martial law, 
the government in Taiwan has been proactively promoting increased transparency 
and accountability in government. In fulfillment of another one of her other 
campaign promises, President Tsai Ing-wen continues to work on providing 
transitional justice for the victims by opening archives so that they are free to 
research the atrocities that occurred during the martial law period and promising 
to write a comprehensive report on government oppression during the martial law 
era.44 The desire to legitimize the Court's decision and to add an extra layer of 
process may have been another motivating factor for the remedial delay used by 
the Constitutional Court in Interpretation 748. 
38 See, e.g., Stewart Chang, The Postcolonial Problem for Global Gay Rights, 32 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 
354 (2014) (Singapore engaged in re-Sinification and neo-Confucianism that focused on Asian values 
in response to decades of Western colonial domination that had created loss of cultural identity). 
39 JOEL S. FETZER & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, CONFUCIANISM, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN TAIWAN 33 (2013). 
40 Id. at 69-77; see also WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 4 ( 1998) ("Taiwan, rather than pitting Confucian values 
against democracy and human rights, was moving in the other direction-away from one-party 
tutelage by the Kuomintang and toward a more representative electoral democracy"). 
41 Cing-Kae Chiao, Employment Discrimination in Taiwan, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2008). 
42 Law and Chang, supra note 35, at 543. 
43 Interpretation No. 261, 1990, Const. Ct. lnterp. (Constitutional Court June 6, 1990). 
44 Lee Hsin-fang, Tsai Recommits to Transitional Justice, TAIPEI TIMES, June 25, 2017, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017 /06/25/2003673259. 
157 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 34:2 
Around the same time that Taiwan was under martial law, South Africa 
existed as an Apartheid state. South Africa exited World War II as a Union still 
technically within the British Commonwealth, but with a government that 
implemented a formal system of segregation and racial discrimination. After the 
National Party, which ran on an Apartheid platform, took power with the election 
of 1948, its government passed a series oflaws that disenfranchised the majority 
black population in order to maintain power and dominance. The National Party 
also saw Communism as a threat to South Africa. Thus, the National Party 
implemented tactics similar to those employed by the Kuomintang to solidify its 
rule during martial law in Taiwan. For example, anti-Apartheid political parties 
and advocacy groups, such as the African National Congress, the South African 
Communist Party, and the United Democratic Front were all banned. 
During this time, the South Afiican government also implemented police 
power by declaring States of Emergency in order to neutralize political dissent 
and resistance. Furthermore, the National Party instituted a movement of 
conservative family values that condemned sex and sexuality. Thus, the post­
World War II histories of both Taiwan and South Africa involved regimes that 
severely restricted the civil liberties of their populations. Apartheid continued in 
South Africa even after it achieved complete independence from the British as a 
Republic in 1961. Despite increasing pressure from the international community 
to cease Apartheid, the system persisted until the 1990s when F. W. de Klerk 
became State President and opened negotiations to end Apartheid. This was about 
the same time that martial law was finally lifted in Taiwan. Thus, the two 
countries became fully democratized at roughly the same time, and the 
restructurings of their respective government systems were extremely sensitive to 
the restrictions put in place by the authoritarian regimes before them. 
In South Africa, reform began as De Klerk ordered the release of Nelson 
Mandela from prison and lifted the ban on alternative political parties, which led 
to extensive negotiations between the National Party and the African National 
Congress to end Apartheid and fully democratize the nation. The defining steps 
of the new reformed government would be free elections and crafting of a new 
Constitution. Due to the history of structural racism and discrimination, the 
central underlying tenet of the new democratic political structure was equality. 
This led to the passage ofa particularly robust equal protection clause in the post­
Apartheid Constitution. Section 9(3) of the South African Constitution provides: 
"The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, language and birth." Notably, the post-Apartheid South African 
Constitution is the first of its kind to recognize sexual orientation as a protected 
classification. Along with the new Constitution, a new Constitutional Court of 
South Africa was established to enforce these protections. 
The first test for the new Constitution and the Constitutional Court in respect 
to the rights of gay individuals was a challenge to the anti-sodomy laws. In 
National Coalition for Gay and lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa found that the anti-sodomy statute, Section 
20A of the Sexual Offences Act, which had been inherited from Dutch colonial 
rule and survived through British rule, was incompatible with the new 
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Constitution of post-Apartheid South Africa. Section 9(3) specifically lists sexual 
orientation as a protected class.45 Because the anti-sodomy laws only applied to 
gay men, they discriminated based on gender and sexual orientation. 
Furthermore, the Court retroactively applied the decision to the date that the 
Interim Constitution was adopted, April 27, 1994. The lifting of anti-sodomy 
restrictions would pave the path to increased rights for the gay community, 
including protections from workplace discrimination and adoption rights, and 
finally culminating in the recognition of same-sex marriage equality in Minister 
of Home Affairs v. Fourie. 
Fourie , like Loving, is fundamentally an equal protection case. Though the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa mentions to the right of privacy and the right 
to marry and procreate, the case is not premised on the fundamental rights to 
privacy as construed in the United States. Justice Albie Sachs, the author of the 
decision, even explicitly states: "I do not find it necessary to consider whether it 
in addition constitutes a violation of their right to privacy in terms of section 14 
of the Constitution."46 Rather, the fundamental right of privacy and the right to 
marry are invoked insofar as they constitute the method by which gay individuals 
are being treated differently from heterosexual individuals. Thus, the South 
African Court does not tie the dignity of individuals so much to the fundamental 
right to marry, but to the right to be treated equally. In Fourie, the Court 
concludes: "the rights of dignity and equality are closely related. The exclusion to 
which same-sex couples are subjected, manifestly affects their dignity as members 
ofsociety."47 Though the South African Court does venerate marriage in Fourie, 
Justice Sachs does not present marriage as the necessary ends to achieving dignity. 
The autonomy and choice to enter marriage or not is the indicator of dignity, and 
denial of the right to choose becomes the crux of the unequal treatment. Sachs 
reasons that, "[]f heterosexual couples have the option of deciding whether to 
marry or not, so should same-sex couples have the choice as whether to seek to 
achieve a status and a set of entitlements and responsibilities on a par with those 
enjoyed by heterosexual couples."48 
Unlike in the United States and Taiwan, sexual orientation is specifically 
enumerated as a protected class under the South African Constitution. Section 
9(3) of the South African Constitution reads: "The state may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth." Justice Sachs particularly notes that in the post-Apartheid 
era, South Africa sought to break with its past by implementing robust equal 
protection within its Constitution; he writes: "Finally, our Constitution represents 
a radical rupture with a past based on intolerance and exclusion, and the 
45 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 
(12) BCLR 1517 (CC).
46 Minister of Home A.ffairsv Fourie 2006 (3) BCLR355 (CC) atfn. 110 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Fourie]. 
47 Id. at ii I 14. 
48 Id at ,i 72. 
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movement forward to the acceptance of the need to develop a society based on 
equality and respect by all for all."49 
However, Justice Sachs was also sensitive to the possible perception of 
judicial activism and backlash. 50 In order to reinforce public trust that the 
judiciary was not acting contrary to the public will, Sachs issued a one-year grace 
period for the legislature to correct the law before the decision would come into 
effect. Justice Sachs justified the delay by maintaining that "[i]t needs to be 
remembered that not only the courts are responsible for vindicating the rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The legislature is in the frontline in this respect."51 
Holning Lau suggests that the remedial delay mirrors the strategy taken by Brown 
v. Board of Education II, where "the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the
integration of racially segregated schools should proceed with "all deliberate
speed," thereby creating a flexible grace period for desegregation."52 Whereas
the remedial delay in Brown II drew sharp criticism for slowing integration in the
United States, Lau considers the potentially positive opportunities that a remedial
delay can afford.
By involving the legislature in the process, a remedial delay placates the 
potential for legislative backlash in response to any public perception of judicial 
overreaching. Judicial action against standing statutes can be perceived as 
overriding the will of the people, which may undermine the authority of the Court 
in popular opinion. Lau concludes in the case of Fourie, "that the grace period 
enhanced the perceived legitimacy of both the court and same-sex marriage."53 
Furthermore, the one-year grace period opened the opportunity for opposing sides 
on the issue to dialogue, which reaped a more collaborative process that also 
helped mitigate backlash. The legislature responded and passed the Civil Union 
Act in 2006 to comply with the Fourie order with minimal resistance and 
backlash. In this way, the Fourie Court was able to spur the legislature into a 
leadership role to guide the public to a more tolerant and equitable position. 
The incrementalist approach taken in the United States, in contrast, believes 
it is best to wait for societal values to change and evolve, and then let the court 
order reflect the change in societal morals. Two years prior to Obergefell, the 
United States Supreme Court was presented with nearly the identical issue in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, which dealt with California's same-sex marriage equality 
ban. Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution so that "only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California."54 At the 
district court level, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the Court found that Proposition 
8 violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 55 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and his successor 
Jerry Brown had previously declined to defend the law. Thus, the State of 
California elected not to appeal, and interveners entered to take the place of the 
49 Id. at ii 59. 
50 Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial Delays, 91 TUL. L. REV. 259,286 
(2016). 51 Fourie, supra note 46, at ,i 138.52 Lau, supra note 50, at 263.53 Id. at 286.
54 California Marriage Act, Proposition 8 (2008) (codified at Cal. Const. Art. I, §7.5).55 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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government on appeal. The Ninth Circuit, recognizing the standing of the 
interveners to appeal, affirmed the district court decision, and subsequently the 
interveners continued the appeal to the Supreme Court. 
In Hollingsworth v. Perry, announced the same day as Windsor, the Supreme 
Court declined to revisit the Ninth Circuit decision because the interveners lacked 
standing. At the time the Court decided Hollingsworth, only eleven states and the 
District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage. The Court avoided 
reviewing the substantive merits of the case by basing its ruling on standing, 
which is consistent with the incrementalist position that perhaps the nation as a 
whole was not ready for the change and therefore the Court should not yet act. 
Though Windsor had struck down a portion of the Defense of Marriage Act that 
prohibited same-sex marriage at the federal level, legalization of same-sex 
marriage was left to individual states. By the time Obergefell came before the 
Court, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex 
marriage, signaling that the time was right to nationalize same-sex marriage 
equality. 
As an alternative, Interpretation 748 and Fourie stand for the notion that 
rather than simply reflect the values of society, lawmakers should provide 
direction for where the values of the society should proactively evolve. Indeed, 
Justice Sachs has in mind the leadership role of lawmakers as he reasons, "I 
believe that Parliament is well-suited to finding the best ways of ensuring that 
same-sex couples are brought in from the legal cold. The law may not 
automatically and of itself eliminate stereotyping and prejudice. Yet it serves as a 
great teacher, establishes public norms that become assimilated into daily life and 
protects vulnerable people from unjust marginalisation and abuse."56 The role of 
the government is not only to represent the will of the people, but also to lead the 
people. 
Ill. MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: 
WAS LOVING EVER REALLY ABOUT LOVING? 
Same-sex marriage equality jurisprudence in the United States takes the more 
expedient path of due process rather than equal protection largely due to a 
misreading of Loving v. Virginia. Indeed, Loving has developed a mythos within 
American culture as the case that illustrates how "love conquers hate."57 Though 
Loving is popularly conceived of as the precursor for Obergefell,58 it actually 
comes from a much different analytical tradition. Obergefell is a due process case 
that only mentions equal protection. Loving is an equal protection case that only 
mentions due process. Constitutional challenges based on the equal protection 
and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment ask fundamentally 
56 Fourie, supra note 46, at ,i 138 
57 Osagie K. Obasogie, Was loving v. Virginia Really About love?, THE ATLANTIC, June 12, 2017, 
https:/ /www. theatl antic. com/pol itics/archi ve/2017 /06/lovi ng-v-virgi nia-marks-its-fi ftieth-
anni versary/ 529929/ ("Loving is widely praised as a case about law ceding to the power oflove in the 
face of astonishing harassment and bigotry endured by interracial couples."). 
58 Id. ("The redemptive trope coming out of the loving decision that love conquers all has also
influenced other social movements, such as those leading to Obergefellv. Hodges-the 2015 Supreme 
Court decision recognizing same-sex marriage."). 
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different questions. Equal protection challenges ask whether there is a compelling 
state interest in treating individuals differently, whereas due process challenges 
ask whether there is a compelling state interest in placing limitations on a 
fundamental liberty interest. 
Although Obergefell and its predecessor United States v. Windsor treat 
marriage equality as a matter of due process, at one point in time, marriage and 
procreation rights were treated primarily as issues of equal protection. Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, which is widely cited for first recognizing"[ m ]arriage and procreation 
[as] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,"59 was actually an 
equal protection case. In Skinner, the Court applied strict scrutiny in respect to 
differentiating criminals from non-criminals under a mandatory sterilization 
statute. Subsequently, in loving the Court applied strict scrutiny to the 
government justification for differential treatment of individuals based on race. 
The vast majority of the loving decision is devoted to equal protection analysis. 
Citing the equal protection cases Hirabayashi v. United States60 and Korematsu 
v. United States,61 the loving Court asserts, as its central premise for striking
down the law, that discrimination based on racial classifications are "odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality" and
subject to strict scrutiny. 62 In applying strict scrutiny, the Court finds that the only
state purpose for the law was to maintain white supremacy, which the Court
condemns as illegitimate. The loving Court only mentions marriage as a
fundamental liberty interest briefly in closing, but the reasoning for the decision
is almost entirely based on equal protection. Thus, loving is more in line to
Brown v. Board of Education as an anti-discrimination, anti-subordination case
than a due process case. In fact, though Griswold v. Connecticut, which
prominently applied due process protections within the context of marriage, had
been decided two years prior, loving does not engage in the same line ofanalysis
or even mention Griswold. The only precedential authority that Loving cites in
respect to its short due process section is Skinner v. Oklahoma and Maynard v.
Hill.63 Yet Skinner, again, was also an equal protection case.
Apart from Skinner and loving, the protection of marriage rights has shifted 
away from being one of equal protection into one of due process liberty that is 
geared at protecting autonomy of the nuclear family unit. Decided two years prior 
to loving, Griswold interprets Skinner in a way that creates a path for the due 
process analysis. Griswold cites Skinner in its application of strict scrutiny, but 
not as an issue of equal protection, but instead in respect to the fundamental liberty 
interests in marriage and childrearing. Griswold evokes Skinner in developing 
the penumbra) right of privacy into a fundamental liberty interest, which then 
triggers strict scrutiny. In this way, the question before the Court started to move 
away from the equal protection question, whether there is a compelling state 
interest in treating people differently in respect to the right to marry and procreate, 
59 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942). 
60 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
61 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
62 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 8 (1967). 
61 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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to the due process question, whether there is a compelling government interest in 
restricting the right of everyone universally to marry and procreate. 
Griswold is the first in a line of privacy cases that become the foundation for 
Lawrence v. Texas,64 which then serves as the direct precursor for the same-sex 
marriage equality cases Windsor and Obergefell. The Constitutional question in 
that line of cases shifts away from scrutinizing why individuals are being treated 
differently, to asking whether the government can abrogate fundamental rights 
relating to family formation. By the time of the Obergefell decision, the equal 
protection elements of Skinner and Loving had been largely lost and folded into 
the lineage of the due process privacy cases. In Obergefell, Kennedy shifts the 
attention away from the protected classifications, and onto the universal right to 
marry. He writes, "loving did not ask about a 'right to interracial marriage'; 
Turner did not ask about a 'right of inmates to marry'; and Zablocki did not ask 
about a 'right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.' Rather, each 
case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there 
was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right. "65 
The "comprehensive" right to marry, rather than the right of each individual class 
to be treated equally, becomes the driving issue before the Court in Obergefell. 
Notably, Justice Kennedy lists Loving alongside Turner v. Sajley66 and 
Zablocki v. Redhail,67 which are both due process cases. Zablocki is problematic 
because it peculiarly elides equal protection with fundamental liberty interests, 
which ultimately allows the occlusion of equal protection in favor of due process 
in right to marriage and procreation cases that follow. Zablocki applies strict 
scrutiny to strike down a Wisconsin statute that allowed the state to deny the right 
to marry to any noncustodial parent who failed to pay child support. The Court 
appears to rule that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of equal 
protection; however, in coming to that conclusion, the Court identifies marriage 
as a fundamental right that cannot be abrogated absent an important state interest. 
As such, the scrutiny applied did not question whether there was a state purpose 
for discrimination against different types of individuals, but rather whether there 
was a state interest in limiting a fundamental freedom that is available to all. As 
Justice Stewart notes in his concurrence, the decision of the Court 
"misconceive[s] the meaning of that constitutional guarantee. The Equal 
Protection Clause deals not with substantive rights or freedoms but with 
invidiously discriminatory classifications."68 By folding equal protection into due 
process analysis, Zablocki appeals to a universalist conception of equal protection. 
Rather, than focusing on the reason for differential treatment, the Court focuses 
on the reason for limiting a universal right. This shift in the analytic framework 
away from the straight equal protection strategy employed in Loving has allowed 
64 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) ("There are broad statements of the substantive reach 
of liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier cases, including Pierce v. Society of Sisters ... and 
Meyer v. Nebraska ... but the most pertinent beginning point is our decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut."). 
65 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
66 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
67 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
68 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,391 (1978) (Stewart, J. concurring). 
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the privileging of due process over equal protection as the preferred analytical 
method by which the Court deals with restrictions on sex and marriage. However, 
this has had the collateral consequence of mingling the two issues in a way that 
ultimately gives favored status to the institution of marriage. 
Furthermore, due process privacy rights are often at odds with equal 
protection. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which is cited as a central precedent that 
leads to the penumbra) right of privacy, was fundamentally a case about parental 
autonomy in childrearing. 69 These privacy interests in education would come to
a head with equal protection following Brown v. Board, which ordered 
desegregation at a time when private attitudes of many Americans towards 
integrated race relations had not yet shifted. In Milliken v. Bradley,70 the Court 
indirectly suggested that as long as the government does not proactively promote 
segregation, individual privacy rights of parents to raise their children in school 
districts of their own choosing would allow them to engage in de-facto 
segregation, which directly subverts the objective of equal protection envisioned 
by Brown.71 The right to autonomy and privacy, which evolved directly from 
fundamental rights associated with the nuclear family, has come to supersede and 
obscure the interests of equal protection. 
This occlusion becomes particularly problematic in respect to how the Court 
approaches sexual orientation. Rather than consider sexual orientation as a 
potentially protected class, the Court avoids the issue by considering sexual 
orientation within the broader penumbra of sexual privacy. Lawrence v. Texas 
was a case that should have centrally raised a question of equal protection, as 
Justice O'Connor notes in her concurrence; 72 the exact same conduct which was
completely legal when engaged in by heterosexual couples, was considered 
criminal when engaged in by gay couples. However, Justice Kennedy does not 
engage in an equal protection analysis, but bases the majority decision primarily 
on due process privacy interest grounds. In the process, Justice Kennedy imagines 
the litigants, John Lawrence and Tyron Gamer, as a normative monogamous 
couple even though there was no factual basis for that assumption.73 Kennedy did
not present gay individuals as a protected class who should be treated the same as 
heterosexuals as a matter of equal protection, but rather his decision appealed to 
the ways gay couples were similar to committed heterosexual couples insofar as 
their universal due process right in forming a "personal bond that is more 
enduring."74 Though Kennedy speaks ofrestoring dignity to gay individuals that 
69 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
70 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
71 Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote I I, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 279, 290 (2005). 
72 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
73 Melissa Murray, The New "Illegitimacy": Revisiting Why Parent Age Should Not Depend on 
Marriage: What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 387, 
398 (2012); Dale Carpenter, The Boundaries of liberty After Lawrence v. Texas: The Unknown Past 
ofLawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464, 1507 (2004). 
74 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Craig Wiltse & Dean Spade, Freedom in a Regulatory 
State?: Lmvrence, Marriage and Biopolitics, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 309,314 (2005) ("They do so by 
addressing homosexuality in  terms of 'coupled' behavior, rather than specific acts of sodomy, thereby 
constructing a homosexual identity more parallel to incentivized heterosexual family norms."). 
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was robbed from them in Bowers v. Hardwick,15 he dignifies them within the 
framework ofa committed relationship. Indeed, Kennedy avoids the central issue 
of sex. For a case about sodomy, the decision is strangely sanitized. Kennedy 
constructs Lawrence and Gamer not as two men wanting to have sex with each 
other, but as two men wanting to enter a "more enduring" committed relationship 
with one another.76 
Kennedy further venerates monogamous commitments in his subsequent 
decisions on marriage equality in United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v.
Hodges, which are similarly based on due process liberty rather than equal 
protection. In Windsor, Kennedy directly associates marriage as the next logical 
step in the pursuit of "a personal bond that is more enduring" that he sets in 
Lawrence.11 Again, rather than engage in equal protection analysis and question 
whether gay individuals should be treated the same as heterosexual individuals, 
the Court employs a universalist argument that marriage is a fundamental right 
that should be enjoyed by all individuals.78 Yet by facilitating equality through 
the protected space of marriage, the Court now sets marriage as the condition for 
equality. In other words, the Court limits protection to a discreet group of citizens 
who concede to conventional norms of sexuality, namely through marriage. 
Moreover, Kennedy appears to suggest that gay individuals achieve dignity only 
through marriage, which debases and marginalizes those who remain outside of 
marriage as "condemned to live in loneliness."79 Thus, rather than protect the 
autonomy of individuals to decide whether to enter marriage or not, Obergefell 
sets marriage as the necessary context to enjoy dignity. 80 
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy presents marriage as the natural choice for 
those who desire to publicly affirm their love and commitment. Marriage 
becomes not only the right choice, but the only choice for gay Americans to be 
treated like everyone else. The elevation of marriage, rather than equality, into 
the principle value in Obergefell skirts the question of whether married and 
unmarried people should be treated differently, which further obscures the more 
important question of whether married people should be granted beneficial 
treatment from the state in the first place. When access to marriage becomes the 
75 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
76 DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 193 (2012) 
(discussing how the legal team for Lawrence and Garner "carefully focused on sex as normatively 
desirable in connection with stability, commitment, and family-not in connection with a broader 
sexual liberation"); see also Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of 
Lawrence v. Texas, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2012, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover-dahlia-lithwick ("The litigation 
strategy, as the case made its way up through the trial courts and appeals courts, was deliberately 
framed to highlight the need to decriminalize homosexual conduct as a means of recognizing and 
legitimatizing same-sex 'relationships' and 'families.' In short, the legal issue was not that free societies 
must let drunken gay Texans have sex; it was that gay families around the country, in the words of 
one of the lawyers in the case, 'are essentially just like everybody else.'"). 
77 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013). 
78 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) ("Like choices concerning contraception, family 
relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions 
concerning marriage arc among the most intimate that an individual can make."). 
79 Id. at 2608. 
80 See Stewart Chang, ls Gay the New Asian?: Marriage Equalily and the Dawn of A New Model 
Minorily, 23 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 25 (2016). 
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measure of equality, the right to marry becomes a mandate to marry. State 
recognition and protection of individuals become matters of personal 
responsibility and choice: those who opt into the system avail themselves of those 
rights and those who do not opt in can be said to have purposely chosen to be left 
out, which then can justify rather than diminish further discriminatory conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The strategy employed to achieve same-sex marriage equality in the 
United States, and which led to the Obergefell decision, was motivated by 
avoiding backlash.81 As Bill Eskridge proposed: "A process that is incremental 
and persuades people or their representatives of the acceptability or even 
desirability of minority rights is much more likely to stick. The incremental 
process will take a lot longer, but it will be more lasting."82 By framing the issue 
within a universally valued principle like marriage, which the general population 
can relate to, granting some rights and protections to the gay population is made 
more palpable to the public at large. 83 The danger of reaching this result in this 
manner, however, is that marriage equality becomes an illusion of complete 
equality for the gay community. Indeed, public attention and discourse on gay 
and lesbian issues has largely moved on since Obergefell. The accomplishment 
of marriage equality suggests that the work of gay rights has reached completion 
in the United States, at least defined by incrementalists who mark legalization of 
sexual relations as the beginning of gay rights and marriage as the end. 84 If, as 
the incrementalists had suggested, marriage equality indeed signified the "end" of 
gay rights, then the fight was over. For example, Empire State Pride Agenda, a 
leading gay rights advocacy group in New York, announced that it was ceasing 
operations in 20 I 6, citing the fulfillment of its campaign for equality. 85 Without 
a driving cause, activists and donors moved on to different projects. According 
81 Roberta A. Kaplan, "It's All A bout Edie, Stupid": lessons From litigating United States v. Windsor, 
29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 87 (2015) (discussing the litigation strategy for United States v. 
Windsor: "Our goal, however, wasn't to write a 'Harlequin romance.' Rather, what we hoped to do was 
to show that Edie and Thea, who spent forty-four years together in sickness and in health 'ti! death did 
them part, lived their lives with the same decency and dignity as anyone else. By showing that truth, 
we demonstrated that Edie and Thea had the kind of marriage that any single one of us--straight or 
gay--would be so lucky to have."). 
82 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 
148 (2002). 83 Chang, supra note 80, at 23 ("incrementalist activists showcased gay families and their similarities
to other normative families, and avoided the negative stereotypes of gays as sensual and 
promiscuous"). 
84 Jeremiah A. Ho, Weather Permitting: lncrementalism, Animus, and the Art of Forecasting Marriage 
Equality After U.S. v. Windsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. I, 7 (2014) ("By consensus, [William] Eskridge, 
[Yuval] Merin, and [Kees] Waaldijk all prescribe those steps in the following sequence: (I) the 
decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy occurs first; (2) then anti-discrimination against 
sexual minorities is furthered; and (3) lastly, the relationships of same-sex couples are then legally 
recognized. Once a state has crossed these three steps, the conditions for marriage equality will then 
be most evident."). 
85 Jesse McKinley, Empire State Pride Agenda to Disband, Citing Fulfillment of Its Mission, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/nyregion/empire-state-pride-agenda-to­
disband-citing-fulfillment-of-its-mission.html?mcubz=O. 
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to one of the leaders of the Empire State Pride Agenda, "We ran out of causes, 
and donors."86 
However, even with marriage equality as an actualized reality in present-day 
America, the gay community remains the target of hate crimes 87 and 
discrimination in the workplace. 88 In his dissent in Oberge;fell, Chief Justice 
Roberts portends a coming backlash, saying "Stealing this issue from the people 
will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social 
change that much more difficult to accept."89 Indeed, there was a rise in 
discriminatory acts targeting the gay individuals immediately following 
Obergefel/; for example, gay employees who got married following the decision 
were fired when they returned to work. 90 Yet these same individuals who could 
now enjoy same-sex marriage equality were left without recourse because sexual 
orientation was not a protected class in the jurisdictions in which they lived. As 
Linda Bell suggests, backlash is often hidden and more insidious than patent 
discrimination.91 The minority group is seen as receiving special treatment and 
privileges, and the public begins to focus their attention on those privileges rather 
than recognizing and addressing surrounding inequities and biases that persist. In 
order to address these and other continuing inequalities, it is necessary to 
reexamine the legacy of privacy that leads to this result, and to revisit Justice 
Stewart's concurrence in Zablocki and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
Lawrence. 
The better path to accomplishing full and complete rights for gay individuals, 
rather, is through equal protection. Whereas gay rights jurisprudence in the 
United States may have painted itself into a due process corner that cannot likely 
be undone, Taiwan and South Africa offer alternative models for gay rights that 
has ramifications beyond marriage equality, but which also avoid backlash. 
Interpretation 7 48 and Fourie take the bold step of recognizing sexual orientation 
as a protected class. They also provide a jurisprudential model that can aligns 
with laws that more broadly protect gay individuals in other areas of life outside 
of the private realm of marriage, such as against discrimination in the workplace 
and in education. By issuing mandates to their legislatures to enact change within 
a specific context of equal protection, the Taiwanese and South African 
Constitutional Courts provide a larger framework to legislate laws that can offer 
equal protection beyond the confines of marriage. Interpretation 748 and Fourie 
also assert that the legitimacy of the government does not necessarily depend on 
whether judicial decisions or legislation reflect values that the public is 
8(, Richard Socarides, North Carolina and Gay Rights Backlash, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2016, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news -desk/north-carolina-and-the-gay-rights-backlash. 
87 Steven Maize, How the Orlando Massacre Affects the Fight for LGBT Rights, THE ECONOMIST,
June 23, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2016/06/gay-rights-and­
wrongs. 
88 Katherine Franke, Giving Obergefell the "Roe-Treatment", PUBLIC RIGHTS/PRIVATE CONSCIENCE
PROJECT (July 13, 2015), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/publicrightsprivateconscience 
/2015/07113/ givi ng-oberge fel 1-the-roe-treatment/. 
89 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
90 Franke, supra note 88. 
91 Linda Bell, Women in Philosophy: A Forty Year Perspective on Academic Backlash, in THEORIZING
BACKLASH: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RESISTANCE TO FEMINISM (Anita M. Supreson & 
Ann E. Cudd, eds., 2002). 
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comfortable with. Rather, the Taiwanese and South African Constitutional Courts 
offer decisions that view their governments as leaders and not followers. By 
working in tandem, the judiciary and the legislature can guide the public in 
directions of deeper tolerance and equity, which are applicable not only for 
countries in the Global South, but in the Global North as well. 

